The beyond worst-case synthesis problem was introduced recently by Bruyère et al. [8] : it aims at building system controllers that provide strict worst-case performance guarantees against an antagonistic environment while ensuring higher expected performance against a stochastic model of the environment. Our work extends the framework of [8] and follow-up papers, which focused on quantitative objectives, by addressing the case of ω-regular conditions encoded as parity objectives, a natural way to represent functional requirements of systems.
Introduction
Beyond worst-case synthesis. Two-player zero-sum games [15, 17] and Markov decision processes (MDPs) [14, 4] are two popular frameworks to model decision making in adversarial and uncertain environments respectively. In the former, a system controller (player 1) and its environment (player 2) compete antagonistically, and synthesis aims at building strategies for the controller that ensure a specified behavior against all possible strategies of the environment.
In the latter, the system is faced to a given stochastic model of its environment, and the focus is on satisfying a given level of expected performance, or a specified behavior with a sufficient probability.
The beyond worst-case synthesis framework was introduced by Bruyère et al. [8] to unite both views: in this setting, we look for strategies that provide both strict worst-case guarantees and a good level of performance against the stochastic model. Such requirements are natural in many practical situations (e.g., see [7, 20] for applications to the shortest path problem). The original paper [8] dealt with mean-payoff and shortest path quantitative settings. Substantial follow-up work include, e.g., multi-dimensional extensions [11] , optimization of the expected mean-payoff under hard Boolean constraints [1] or under energy constraints [5] , or integration of beyond worst-case concepts in the tool Uppaal [12] .
Parity objectives. In this paper, we study the beyond worst-case problem for ω-regular conditions encoded as parity objectives. Parity games have been under close scrutiny for a long time both due to their importance (e.g., they subsume modal µ-calculus model checking [13] ) and their intriguing complexity: they belong to the class of problems in NP ∩ coNP [16] and despite many efforts (see [9] for pointers), whether they belong to P is still an open question.
In the aforementioned papers dealing with beyond worst-case problems, the focus was on quantitative objectives. While it is usually the case that qualitative objectives, such as parity, are easier to deal with than qualitative ones, this is not true in the setting considered in this paper. Indeed, in the context of quantitative objectives, it is conceivable to alternate between two strategies along a play, such that one -efficient -strategy balances the performance loss due to playing the other -less efficient -strategy for a limited stretch of play infinitely often. In the context of qualitative objectives, this is no more possible in general, as one strategy may induce behaviors (such as invalidating the parity condition infinitely often) that can never be counteracted by the other one. Hence, in comparison, we need to define more elaborate analysis techniques to detect when satisfying both the worst-case and the probabilistic constraints with a single strategy is actually possible. 
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Markov decision processes. A (finite) Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple M = (G, S 1 , S 2 , δ) where (i) G = (S, E) is a directed graph; (ii) (S 1 , S 2 ) is a partition of S into states of player 1 (denoted by P 1 and representing the system) and states of player 2 (denoted by P 2 and representing the stochastic environment); (iii) δ : S 2 → D(S) is the transition function that, given a stochastic state s ∈ S 2 , defines the probability distribution δ(s) over the successors of s, such that for all s ∈ S 2 , Supp(δ(s)) = Succ(s) (i.e., all outgoing edges of have non-zero probability to be taken). An MDP where for all s ∈ S 1 , |Succ(s)| = 1 (or equivalently, S 1 = ∅) is a fully-stochastic process called a Markov chain (MC).
A prefix ρ ∈ Pref(M) belongs to P i , i ∈ {1, 2}, if Last(ρ) ∈ S i . The set of prefixes that belong to P i is denoted by Pref i (M).
Strategies.
A strategy for P 1 is a function λ : Pref 1 (M) → D(S), such that for all ρ ∈ Pref 1 (M), we have Supp(λ(ρ)) ⊆ Succ(Last(ρ)). The set of all strategies in M is denoted by Λ. Pure strategies have their support equal to a singleton for all prefixes. When a strategy λ is pure, we simplify its notation and write λ(ρ) = s instead of λ(ρ)(s) = 1, for any ρ ∈ Pref 1 (M) and the unique state s ∈ Supp(λ(ρ)).
A strategy λ for P 1 can be encoded by a stochastic state machine with outputs, called stochastic Moore machine, M = (M, m 0 , α u , α n ) where (i) M is a finite or infinite set of memory elements, (ii) m 0 ∈ M is the initial memory element, (iii) α u : M × S → M is the update function, and (iv) α n : M × S 1 → D(S) is the next-action function. If the MDP is in s ∈ S 1 and m ∈ M is the current memory element, then the strategy chooses s , the next state of the MDP, according to the probability distribution α n (m, s). When the MDP leaves a state s ∈ S, the memory is updated to α u (m, s). Hence updates are deterministic and outputs are potentially stochastic. Formally, (M, m 0 , α u , α n ) defines the strategy λ such that λ(ρ · s) = α n ( α u (m 0 , ρ), s) for all ρ ∈ Pref(M) and s ∈ S 1 , where α u extends α u to sequences of states starting from m 0 as expected. Note that pure strategies have deterministic next-action functions. A strategy λ is finite-memory if |M | < ∞ and memoryless if |M | = 1. That is, it does not depend on the history but only on the current state of the MDP: in this case, we have that λ : S 1 → D(S). Finally, if the same strategy can be used no matter the initial state, we say that a uniform strategy exists.
A play π is said to be consistent with a strategy λ if for all n ≥ 0 such that π(n) ∈ S 1 , we have that π(n + 1) ∈ Supp(λ(π(0, n)). This notion is defined similarly for prefixes. We denote by Out M (λ) ⊆ Plays(G) the set of plays consistent with λ. We use Out M s (λ) when fixing an initial state s.
Given a strategy λ in M and a prefix ρ ∈ Pref 1 (M), we define the initialized strategy λ[ρ] as follows:
Markov chain induced by a strategy. An MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) and a strategy λ for P 1 encoded by the stochastic Moore machine M = (M, m 0 , α u , α n ) determine an MC C = (G , δ ) on the state space S = S × M as follows. For any pair of states s 1 = (s 1 , m 1 ) and s 2 = (s 2 , m 2 ) in S , δ (s 1 )(s 2 ) = α n (s 1 , m 1 )(s 2 ) if m 2 = α u (s 1 , m 1 ) and 0 otherwise. Observe that given a finite MDP, a finite-memory (resp. infinite-memory) strategy induces a finite (resp. infinite) MC. We define plays and prefixes of an induced MC as before, considering only transitions with non-zero probability. Let M = (G, S 1 , S 2 , δ) be an MDP, s ∈ S an initial state and λ a strategy of P 1 encoded by M = (M, m 0 , α u , α n ). Let A ⊆ Plays(G). We denote by P λ M,s [A] the probability of the plays of the induced MC C (starting in (s, m 0 )) whose projection (defined by removing the memory elements) to M is in A, i.e., the probability of event A when M is executed with initial state s and strategy λ. Note that every Borel set A has a uniquely defined probability [21] (Carathéodory's extension theorem induces a unique probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra over Plays(G)). Throughout the paper, we may also write P λ M,s [A] for A a set of prefixes: this is an abuse of notation meaning that we consider the probability of the set of plays A containing all consistent continuations of prefixes in A (i.e., we consider the probability of the cylinders defined by those prefixes).
Two-player games. Observe that in MDPs, we call both P 1 and P 2 players, though P 2 does not have controllable choices. Indeed, an MDP can be seen as a game where P 1 plays against a stochastic adversary P 2 using the fixed memoryless randomized strategy δ: they are sometimes called 1 1 2 -player games. Throughout this paper, we also need to consider real two-player games, denoted G = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 ). In those games, both players control their actions using strategies: we extend all previous notions (e.g., strategies) to P 2 and games. In particular, any MDP M = (G, S 1 , S 2 , δ) can be seen as a two-player game by forgetting about the transition function δ and letting P 2 pick the strategy of its choice. Mixing both interpretations (stochastic and antagonistic versions of P 2 ) is crucial in the beyond worst-case framework that we study here.
Objectives.
Given an MDP M = (G, S 1 , S 1 , δ), an objective is a set of plays A ⊆ Plays(G). We consider two classical objectives from the literature. Both define measurable events. To define them, we introduce the following notation: given a play π ∈ Plays(G), let inf(π) = {s ∈ S | ∀ i ≥ 0, ∃ j ≥ i, π(j) = s} be the set of states seen infinitely often along π.
Reachability. Given a target T ⊆ S, the reachability objective asks for plays that visit T :
We later use the LTL notation ♦T to denote the event Reach(T ). Parity. Let p : S → {1, 2, . . . , d} be a priority function that maps each state to an integer priority, where d ≤ |S| + 1 (w.l.o.g.). The parity objective asks that, among the priorities seen infinitely often, the maximal one be even: Parity(p) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | max s∈inf(π) p(s) is even}. We later simply use p to denote the event Parity(p).
Technical tools
For the following definitions, let M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) be an MDP.
Attractors. The attractor for P i , i ∈ {1, 2}, of a target set of states T , denoted Attr i (T ) is computed as the fixed point of the sequence Attr n+1
It contains all states from which P i can force a visit of T . Observe that this notion interprets P 2 as an antagonistic adversary, i.e., having the choice of his strategy.
Traps, end-components and sub-MDPs.
An end-component (EC) of M is a trap C for P 2 that is strongly connected, i.e., for any two states s, s ∈ C, there exists a path from s to s in G. It is well-known that inside an EC C, P 1 can force the visit of any state s ∈ C with probability 1 (that is, when P 2 is seen as stochastic and obeys the strategy δ), see e.g., [4] . The union of two ECs with non-empty intersection is an EC. An EC C is thus maximal if, for every EC C , C ⊆ C ∨ C ∩ C = ∅.
Given an EC C ⊆ S of M, we denote by M C the sub-MDP that is naturally defined by M C = (G = (C, E ∩ C × C), S 1 = S 1 ∩ C, S 2 = S 2 ∩ C, δ ), where δ : S 2 → D(C) is simply the restriction of δ to the domain C. Note that M C is a well-defined MDP: it has no deadlock since C is strongly connected and in all stochastic states s, the support of δ (s) is included in C (as C was an EC in M).
Technical lemmas. Before turning to the beyond worst-case problem, we recall some classical results about MDPs that will be useful later on.
Lemma 2 (Optimal reachability [4] ). Given an MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) and a target set T ⊆ S, we can compute for each state s ∈ S the maximal probability v * s to reach T , in polynomial time. There is an optimal uniform pure memoryless strategy λ * that enforces v * s from all s ∈ S. Fix s ∈ S and c ∈ Q such that c < v * s . Then there exists k ∈ N such that by playing λ * from s for k steps, we reach T with probability larger than c. Lemma 3 (Long-run appearance of ECs [4] ). Given an MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) and E = {C ⊆ S | C is an EC in M} the set of all its end-components, for any strategy λ of P 1 and any state s ∈ S, the following holds:
The beyond worst-case framework
Events and probabilistic operators. Consider an MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ).
Recall that we have defined two types of measurable events (specific subsets of Plays(G)) with respective notations ♦T for T ⊆ S (reachability), and p for p : S → {1, . . . , d} a priority function (parity). We define three operators to reason about the probabilities of these events: S, P ∼c , and AS. Given an event A and a state s, they are used as follows:
A is sure from s, denoted s |= S(A), if there exists a witness strategy λ of P 1 such that Out M s (λ) ⊆ A. Here probabilities are ignored and we consider P 2 as antagonistic. A holds with probability (resp. strictly) greater than c ∈ Q from s, denoted s |= P ≥c (A) (resp. s |= P >c (A)) if there exists λ such that P λ
For any operator O, we also write s, λ |= O(A) to denote that λ is a witness strategy for s |= O(A). We will also consider combinations of the type s |= O 1 (A 1 ) ∧ O 2 (A 2 ) for two operators and events: in this case, we require that the same strategy be a witness for both conjuncts, i.e., that there exists λ such that s, λ |= O 1 (A 1 ) and s, λ |= O 2 (A 2 ). Finally, we will sometimes use different MDPs, in which case we add the considered MDP M as a subscript on |=, e.g., s |= M O(A). We drop this subscript when the context is clear.
Beyond worst-case problems. Let M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) be an MDP, s ∈ S be an initial state, and p 1 , p 2 be two priority functions on M. Throughout this paper, we provide algorithms to decide the existence of a witness strategy -and synthesize it -for the following formulae combining worst-case and probabilistic guarantees regarding parity objectives:
1. s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) -this is the canonical beyond worst-case (BWC) problem; 2. s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ∼c (p 2 ) for ∼ ∈ {>, ≥} and c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1).
Reachability under parity constraint
In this section, we consider the synthesis of strategies that enforce to reach a target set of states T ⊆ S with high probability while enforcing a parity condition surely. Using the previously defined notations, we consider two variants of the problem, given a state s ∈ S and a priority function p : S → {1, . . . d}: . If the answer is Yes, then there exists a finite-memory witness strategy. This decision problem is at least as hard as solving parity games.
Almost-sure reachability

Proof. A slight variant of this result has been established inside the proof of [2, Lemma 3]
(extended version of [1] ), where it is asked that the parity condition holds not necessarily on all consistent plays but only on all plays that do not reach the target set T . We reduce our problem to the latter as follows. First, we compute all states in S from which P 1 can enforce p surely. This boils down to solving a classical parity game [16] . We remove all states that are not surely winning for p in M as entering one of those states implies that the parity condition will be violated on some consistent play. Then we apply the approach described in the proof of [2, Lemma 3] to the resulting MDP: it is based on a reduction to a particular parity-Büchi game based on the MDP. 1 If the answer is Yes for s 0 , we answer Yes to our problem, otherwise we answer No. We claim that this reduction is correct. First, it is clear that satisfying their constraint is a necessary condition to satisfy ours. Now, if there is a strategy λ that ensures to reach T almost-surely in the reduced MDP and enforces p on all the consistent plays that never reach T , then we construct a strategy λ that plays as λ up to reaching T (if ever) and then switches to the strategy λ p that enforces p surely. This new strategy is a witness for our problem since the parity objective is prefix-independent. That is, s 0 , λ |= S(p) ∧ AS(♦T ). Since both solving the parity game and solving the parity-Büchi game from [2, Lemma 3] are in NP ∩ coNP, we conclude that our decision problem has the claimed complexity. Furthermore, our problem clearly generalizes parity games: it suffices to fix T = S to trivially ensure the second conjunct and obtain a classical parity game. Hence, the hardness follows.
Finally, since λ p is memoryless w.l.o.g. and the strategy λ obtained via [2, Lemma 3] is also finite-memory (due to the reduction to a parity-Büchi game), we have that our witness strategy λ is also finite-memory.
Reachability with threshold probability
Optimal reachability strategies. We first study strategies that maximize the probability of reaching a target set of states T ⊆ S in an MDP M. Recall that Lemma 2 states the existence of an optimal uniform pure memoryless strategy λ * that enforces v * s from all s ∈ S, where v * s is the maximal probability to reach T that can be achieved by P 1 in s. We define
that contains all edges that are non-optimal choices for P 1 in the sense that they result in a strict decrease of the probability to reach T .
We show that playing, for a finite number of steps, edges that are optimal for reachability (i.e., edges in E opt = E \ E ¬opt ), and then switching to an optimal strategy to reach T , like λ * , produces an optimal strategy too.
Lemma 5. Let λ * be an optimal uniform pure memoryless strategy in M to reach T , from all states in S. If λ is a strategy that plays only edges in E opt for m steps, for m ∈ N, and then switches to λ * , then λ is also optimal to reach T from all states in S.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. For m = 0, we only play λ * , thus λ is trivially optimal. Now, assume the property holds up to m − 1 steps, for m > 0, i.e., that all strategies playing in E opt for m − 1 steps, and then playing λ * , are optimal. Consider a strategy λ m that does this for m steps now. Strategy λ m thus chooses an edge in E opt , and then switches to a strategy λ m−1 that satisfies the induction hypothesis. So for any state s 0 ∈ S 1 \ T (for s 0 ∈ T , we have probability one whatever the strategy), we have that:
Hence, we obtain that λ m is also optimal from s 0 , which concludes our proof.
Solving the problem. We now turn to the problem s 0 |= S(p) ∧ P ∼ (♦T ). Proof. First, we remove from M the states from which P 1 cannot enforce S(p). In particular if s 0 |= S(p), the answer is No. Remember that it can be done by computing the winning states in M seen as a parity game: a problem that belongs to NP ∩ coNP [16] . We now reason on the MDP M w where those losing states have been removed: it is well-defined as the set of winning states for P 1 in M is a trap for P 2 . We note λ p a uniform pure memoryless strategy that ensures S(p) from any state of M w . The proof of this theorem is easy for the case >, and more involved for ≥. We start with the easy case.
The algorithm for the case > c is as follows. First, we compute the maximal probability v * s0 to reach T , as in Lemma 2. This takes polynomial time. If v * s0 ≤ c, then the answer is clearly No. Otherwise, we claim that the answer is Yes. Let λ * be an optimal uniform pure memoryless strategy enforcing probability v * s0 from s 0 . We construct a witness strategy λ for s 0 |= S(p) ∧ P >c (♦T ) from λ * and λ p as follows. First, starting in s 0 , the strategy λ plays as λ * for k steps where k is taken as in Lemma 2: hence the probability to reach T after k steps is strictly greater than c, which implies that s 0 , λ |= P >c (♦T ). Then, λ switches to λ p . Since the parity objective is prefix-independent, we have that s 0 , λ |= S(p), and we are done. Overall, our procedure lies in NP ∩ coNP. Also observe that our strategy λ is finite-memory since λ * and λ p are memoryless and k is finite thanks to Lemma 2.
We now turn to the case ≥ c. The algorithm, as in the previous case, first computes the maximal probability v * s0 to reach T , in polynomial time. If v * s0 > c, then we answer Yes as we can apply the same reasoning as in the previous case. If v * s0 < c, then we trivially answer No. The more involved case is when v * s0 = c. In this case, we must verify that probability c is still achievable if, in addition, it is required to enforce S(p). To answer this question, we modify M w and we reduce our problem to the almost-sure case of Theorem 4. We present the details in the following. Intuitively, we construct the MDP M as follows:
we enrich states with one bit that records if the set T has been visited or not; while T has not been visited, we suppress all edges controlled by P 1 that are not optimal for reachability, i.e., all edges in E ¬opt ; while T has not been visited, we delete all states that cannot reach T (i.e., all states that do not have a path to T in the underlying graph) and normalize the probability of the edges that survive this deletion: we note the set of states to be removed by S w ¬T .
Formally, the new MDP M is defined as follows:
the probability distributions are then defined as:
Note that each prefix (resp. play) ρ in M is naturally mapped to a unique prefix γ(ρ ) in M w , obtained by projecting away the additional bit of information (about visiting the target T ). Conversely, each prefix (resp. play) ρ in M w that does not use edges in E ¬opt and states in S w ¬T is naturally mapped to a unique prefix α(ρ) in M . Those mappings are such that for all ρ in M , ρ = α(γ(ρ )).
Finally, we claim that
For the sake of readability, we postpone the correctness of this reduction to Lemma 7. Given that the latter problem was shown to be in NP ∩ coNP in Theorem 4, and that M is only polynomially larger than M w (and thus M), we obtain the claimed complexity for the problem. The proof of Lemma 7 also implies that the witness strategy can be finite-memory.
Again, problem s 0 |= S(p) ∧ P ∼c (♦T ) trivially generalizes parity games, by taking T = S, which concludes our proof.
Lemma 7 (Correctness of the reduction used for Theorem 6). The following equivalence holds:
Proof. We start with the left-to-right implication. Assume that there exists a witness strategy λ for P 1 in M such that s 0 , λ |= M S(p) ∧ AS(♦T ). By Theorem 4, we may assume λ to be finite-memory. From λ , we build a strategy λ in M w as follows: for all ρ ∈ Pref(G) that does not visit T , only uses edges in E opt and does not contain states in S w ¬T , λ(ρ) = γ(λ (α(ρ))), i.e., λ mimics λ , for all other ρ ∈ Pref(G), the strategy plays as λ p , the memoryless strategy ensuring S(p) in M w .
Observe that λ is a finite-memory strategy: the conditions to check can be encoded using a finite number of memory elements in addition to the finite Moore machine representing λ . We now claim that s 0 , λ |= M w S(p) ∧ P ≥c (♦T ).
First, consider the conjunct S(p). Along any play π ∈ Plays(G) starting in s 0 , either (i) λ always plays as λ , or (ii) it eventually switches to λ p . In case (i), π has a unique corresponding play in M , π = α(π), and π is consistent with λ . Since λ ensures S(p) by hypothesis and the priority function is the same in M and M w , π also satisfies the parity objective. In case (ii), π also satisfies the parity objective by definition of λ p and prefix-independence of parity. Hence, we have that s 0 , λ |= M w S(p).
It remains to prove that s 0 , λ |= M w P ≥c (♦T ). We prove it by contradiction. Assume that
using the classical always LTL operator. This means that, because of the strict inequality > 1 − c, there exists m in N such that the set
Note that this sum is indeed a lower bound on the probability of ¬T as all prefixes of BadPref define disjoint cylinder sets. Now, we claim that for all ρ ∈ BadPref, we have that Last(ρ) ∈ S w ¬T . To prove it, recall the definition of λ. If it were not true, then λ would have mimicked λ all along ρ (i.e., not switching to λ p ). But since all continuations of ρ consistent with λ in M w never reach T , this would also hold for continuations of α(ρ) consistent with λ in M . Hence prefix α(ρ) would prove that P λ M ,s 0 [♦T ] < 1, which contradicts the hypothesis stating that s 0 , λ |= AS(♦T ). Hence, we can now confirm that for all ρ ∈ BadPref, we have that Last(ρ) ∈ S w ¬T . To pursue, we define a new strategy on M w , λ r : it plays as λ, which only using edges in E opt , for m steps (m as defined above), then switches to λ * , the optimal strategy to reach T in M w , which ensures probability v * s0 = c of reaching T from s 0 (see Proof of Theorem 6). By Lemma 5, we have that λ r is still optimal, hence that P λ r M w ,s0 [♦T ] = c. But by the previous arguments, we also have that
We have obtained the contradiction, hence proving that s 0 , λ |= M w P ≥c (♦T ) and concluding the proof of the left-to-right implication.
We now prove the right-to-left implication. Assume that there exists a witness strategy
Hence, it can be shown that λ must restrict its choices to E opt before reaching T , otherwise it would not be possible to ensure P ≥c (♦T ). Similarly, we can assume w.l.o.g. that λ switches to λ p , the strategy ensuring S(p), after T or S w ¬T is reached: if not the case, we can build a strategy with those properties based on λ that is still a witness for the considered property. We first study λ , which is simply λ played on M , and show that it is a witness for s 0 |= M S(p).
To prove that s 0 , λ |= M S(p), observe that on any play π consistent with λ , we either (i) reach T and switch to λ p (more precisely, its translation over M ), (ii) do not reach T but neither reach S w ¬T (by construction), hence keep playing like λ. In case (i), and since all edges from the initial MDP M w are present after reaching T , λ p can be implemented faithfully and any consistent play π will satisfy the parity objective thanks to prefix-independence. In case (ii), any consistent play π of λ has a unique corresponding play π = γ(π ) in M w that is consistent with λ, hence satisfies the parity objective since λ ensures S(p). We thus conclude that λ is a witness for s 0 |= M S(p).
We now show that T is dense in λ , i.e., that any prefix ρ consistent with λ has a continuation π such that π |= ♦T . In other words, seeing strategy λ as an execution tree, there is no subtree such that all branches in this subtree never visit T . Formally, this is saying that the following set must be empty:
We prove its emptiness by contradiction. Assume there exists a prefix ρ in BadPref . Since it is a prefix in M , it implies by construction that Last(γ(ρ )) ∈ S w ¬T in M w , hence that some paths reach T from Last(γ(ρ )) in the underlying graph. Hence, we can define a new strategy λ r in M w that plays exactly as λ except after prefix γ(ρ ), where it switches to the optimal reachability strategy λ * : the probability to reach T after γ(ρ ) under λ r is thus strictly positive, say equal to q > 0. We know have that
which is in contradiction with c = v * s0 being the maximal achievable probability. Hence, we deduce that BadPref is indeed empty and that T is dense for λ . Now, using the reduction to a parity-Büchi game which underlies Theorem 4, we deduce from the density argument presented in Appendix A that we can build λ from λ such that s 0 , λ |= M S(p) ∧ AS(♦T ). This concludes the proof of the right-to-left implication and of this lemma.
4
Almost-sure parity under parity constraint Overview and key lemma. Here, we study strategies that enforce a parity objective p 1 surely (i.e., on all consistent plays) and a parity objective p 2 almost-surely (i.e., with probability one). Formally, we look at the problem s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). The cornerstone of our approach is the notion of ultra-good end-component. Throughout this section, we consider an MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 1 , δ) with two priority functions p 1 and p 2 .
if in the sub-MDP M C , the following two properties hold:
contains the states with even priorities that are larger than any odd priority in C (this set can be empty for arbitrary ECs but needs to be non-empty for UGECs);
We introduce the following notations:
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UGEC(M) is the set of all UGECs of M, U = ∪ U ∈UGEC(M) U is the set of states that belong to a UGEC in M.
Intuitively, within a UGEC, P 1 has a strategy to almost-surely visit C max even (p 1 ) while guaranteeing S(p 1 ), and he also has a (generally different) strategy that almost-surely ensures both parity objectives. Figure 2 gives an example of UGEC: here, the strategy ensuring (1 U ) is to go to d, and the strategy ensuring (2 U ) is to go to b. The notion of UGEC strengthens the concept of super-good EC that was introduced in [1]: essentially, the super-good ECs are exactly the ECs satisfying (1 U ). Thus, every UGEC is a super-good EC, but the converse is false.
The central lemma underpinning our approach is the following.
Lemma 9.
The following equivalence holds:
Essentially, this lemma permits to reduce the problem under study to the one treated in Theorem 4, provided that we are able to compute U, the set of states appearing in a UGEC. The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of this lemma and its consequences: in Sect. 4.1, we prove the left-to-right implication, in Sect. 4.2, we prove its converse, and finally, in Sect. 4.3, we establish an algorithm to solve problem s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) based on this reduction and we study its complexity.
Left-to-right implication (sufficient condition)
Available strategies in UGECs. We first focus on witness strategies for conditions (1 U ) and (2 U ) of Definition 8. For (1 U ), it was shown in the proof of [2, Lemma 3] (extended version of [1] ) that deciding if the condition holds is in NP ∩ coNP and that uniform finitememory witness strategies exist. For (2 U ), we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let C be an EC of M. The following assertions hold.
1.
It can be decided in polynomial time if condition (2 U ) holds.
2.
If the answer is Yes, then there exists a (uniform randomized) memoryless witness strategy λ 2,C and a sub-EC D ⊆ C such that D max even (p 1 ) = ∅, D max even (p 2 ) = ∅, and for all s ∈ C,
3. Furthermore, λ 2,C satisfies the following property:
Proof. We first prove Point 2. Let C be an EC that satisfies condition (2 U ), and a corresponding witness strategy λ (that could use memory in full generality). By Lemma 3, we know that for any state s ∈ C,
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where E is the set of ECs of M C . We claim that for any D ∈ E for which
we necessarily have that D max even (p 1 ) = ∅ and D max even (p 2 ) = ∅. Indeed, assume this is false for p i . Then, with probability strictly greater than zero, λ induces plays π such that max s ∈inf(π) p i (s ) is odd (as the maximal priority in inf(π) = D is odd). This contradicts the fact that λ is a witness strategy for s |= M C AS(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) (condition (2 U )).
Assume that λ is a witness strategy, potentially leading to several ECs D j satisfying the above property with non-zero probability, and potentially using memory. Since each D j is included in the EC C, it is easy to conceive a witness strategy λ 2,C that reaches and stays in only one of those ECs with probability one (we call it D from now on) and without using any memory: indeed, each state of an EC can be almost-surely visited using a uniform randomized memoryless strategy [4] .
Second, to prove Point 3, it suffices to use Lemma 2. See that λ 2,C reaches D max even (p 1 ) almost-surely from any state s ∈ C. By taking n = k for the k given in Lemma 2 for c = 1 − ε, we obtain the desired property.
Finally, consider Point 1. We claim that (i) the existence of a sub-EC D such that D max even (p 1 ) = ∅ and D max even (p 2 ) = ∅ is not only necessary but also sufficient to satisfy condition (2 U ), and (ii) the existence of such a set can be decided in polynomial time.
For (i), as discussed above, for any sub-EC of C, in particular for D, we can build a uniform randomized memoryless strategy λ such that
By hypothesis on D, we thus have that p 1 and p 2 are almost-surely satisfied by λ, hence that λ is a witness for s |= M C AS(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) and that condition (2 U ) holds in C.
It remains to check the existence of such a set D ⊆ C in polynomial time. First, we check if C max even (p 1 ) = ∅ and C max even (p 2 ) = ∅. If this holds, then D = C and the answer is Yes (it takes linear time obviously). If it does not hold, then we compute the sets
and we iterate this procedure in the sub-EC C ⊂ C defined as
It is easy to see that a suitable D exists if and only if this procedure stops before C = ∅. In addition, this procedure takes at most |C| iterations (as we remove at least one state at each step) and each iteration takes linear time. This implies Point 3 and concludes our proof.
Inside UGECs.
We will now prove that inside any UGEC, there is a strategy for the beyond worst-case problem S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). From now on, let C be a UGEC of M, λ 1,C be a uniform finite-memory witness strategy for condition (1 U ) of Definition 8, and λ 2,C be a uniform randomized memoryless one for condition (2 U ), additionally satisfying the properties of Lemma 10. We build a strategy λ C based on λ 1,C and λ 2,C .
Definition 11. Let C ∈ UGEC(M). Let (n i ) i∈N be a sequence of naturals n i such that
whose existence is granted by Lemma 10. We build the beyond worst-case strategy λ C as follows, starting with i = 0. a) Play λ 2,C for n i steps. Then i = i + 1 and go to b). b) If D max even (p 1 ) was visited in phase a), then go to a). Else, play λ 1,C until C max even (p 1 ) is reached and then go to a).
Observe that λ C requires infinite memory. In the next lemma, we prove that λ C is a proper witness for S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) in the UGEC C.
Proof. Consider the strategy λ C as described in Definition 11 and any state s ∈ C. We first prove that s, λ C |= S(p 1 ). We want to show that for any π ∈ Out M C s (λ C ), max s ∈inf(π) p 1 (s ) is even. Fix such a play π. Three cases are possible: (i) λ C switches infinitely often between λ 1,C and λ 2,C , (ii) it eventually plays λ 1,C forever, and (iii) it eventually plays λ 2,C forever. In case (i), we have that C max even (p 1 ) is visited infinitely often along π. Since any state in this set has an even priority higher than any odd priority in C by definition, we have that π satisfies the parity objective p 1 . In case (ii), we eventually always play as λ 1,C and by hypothesis, we know that s, λ 1,C |= S(p 1 ). By prefix-independence, we thus have that π satisfies the parity objective p 1 . Finally, in case (iii), we have that D max even (p 1 ) is visited infinitely often, and that eventually, play π never leaves the sub-EC D associated to strategy λ 2,C (by definition of λ 2,C , the fact that D max even (p 1 ) ⊆ D is reached, and that we never switch to λ 1,C from some point on). Since any state in D max even (p 1 ) has an even priority higher than any odd priority in D, we have that π satisfies the parity objective p 1 . Therefore, we conclude that s, λ C |= S(p 1 ).
It remains to show that s, λ C |= AS(p 2 ). To do so, we will prove that λ C almost-surely ends up in playing only λ 2,C (which ensures AS(p 2 )). First, observe that λ 1,C almost-surely reaches C max even (p 1 ), hence each phase b) of strategy λ C terminates with probability one. Now, consider the probability x i that λ 1,C is never played again after round i (in which λ 2,C is played for n i steps). For any round i ≥ 1, it is equal to x i = ∞ j=i (1 − 2 −j ) thanks to the choice of n i . Since (1 − 2 −j ) > 0 for any j > 1, we have that log(x i ) = ∞ j=i log(1 − 2 −j ). Now, for any z ∈ [0, 1 2 ], we have the following inequalities:
Using these, we can bound log(x i ) as follows:
Hence, log(x i ) i→+∞ −−−−→ 0, and by continuity of the exponential function, we finally obtain that x i i→+∞ −−−−→ 1. This proves that λ C almost-surely consists in playing as λ 2,C forever from some point on, which combined with the prefix-independence of the parity objective, implies that λ C ensures AS(p 2 ), and concludes our proof.
Global strategy. We can now prove the left-to-right implication of Lemma 9. For this, assume that for s 0 ∈ S, we have that λ U is a witness for s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U), where we recall that U represents the union of all UGECs of the MDP M. Note that such a strategy can be finite-memory w.l.o.g. as proved in Theorem 4. We build a global strategy λ as follows.
Definition 13. Based on strategies λ U and λ C for all C ∈ UGEC(M), we build the global strategy λ as follows. a) Play λ U until a UGEC C is reached, then go to b). b) Play λ C forever.
This strategy requires infinite memory because it is needed for the strategies λ C . We prove that λ is a witness for the beyond worst-case problem S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ).
Lemma 14.
It holds that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ).
Proof. First, we consider S(p 1 ). Along any play π consistent with λ, either (i) a UGEC C is eventually reached and λ switches to λ C , or (ii) λ behaves as λ U forever. Since all strategies λ C and strategy λ U ensure S(p 1 ) and the parity objective is prefix-independent, we have that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ).
Second, with probability one, λ U reaches some UGEC C, in which λ C ensures AS(p 2 ). Again invoking prefix-independence, we conclude that λ is also a witness for s 0 |= AS(p 2 ), which ends our proof.
Right-to-left implication (necessary condition)
We now turn to the converse implication of Lemma 9, i.e., that s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) implies s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U). This in particular requires U to be non-empty, i.e., the existence of a UGEC in M.
Initialized strategies. We start by an intermediate lemma regarding witness strategies for the beyond worst-case problem. It establishes that all states reachable via such a strategy also satisfy the problem.
Lemma 15.
For every state s ∈ S, every strategy λ such that s, λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), and every prefix ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s (λ)), we have that Last(ρ) |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ).
Proof. Fix s ∈ S, λ a witness for s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), and a prefix ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s (λ)). We claim that the initialized strategy λ [ρ] , that behaves as λ behaves after prefix ρ, is a witness for Last(ρ) |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ).
We first consider S(p 1 ). For all π ∈ Out M Last(ρ) (λ[ρ]), we have that ρ · π ∈ Out M s (λ). Furthermore, max s ∈inf(ρ·π) p 1 (s ) = max s ∈inf(π) p 1 (s ) is even since s, λ |= S(p 1 ). Hence, we conclude that Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= S(p 1 ). Now, consider AS(p 2 ). By contradiction, assume that Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= AS(p 2 ), i.e., that
) has strictly positive probability). This contradicts the hypothesis that s, λ |= AS(p 2 ). Hence it holds that Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= AS(p 2 ) and we are done.
Existence of UGECs. The next lemma establishes that at least one UGEC must exist in M since s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). Proof. Given a set of plays Π ⊆ Plays(G), we define
To prove this lemma, we first study the following set S of subsets of S:
Intuitively, this set contains any subset of S that captures all states reachable by some witness strategy λ, from some state s ∈ S. First note that s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) implies that S is non-empty, as for a witness strategy λ, R = States(Out M s0 (λ)) ∈ S, by definition. Second, we show that all minimal elements of S for set inclusion ⊆ are UGECs, i.e., that for all R ∈ min ⊆ (S), it holds that R ∈ UGEC(M). This will establish our lemma. By Definition 8, we have to prove that for each R ∈ min ⊆ (S), the following properties hold:
Before proving those three items, we claim that for all R ∈ min ⊆ (S), and s ∈ R, there exists a strategy λ R such that s, λ R |= M R S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), i.e., λ R satisfies the property without leaving R. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 15 and the minimality of R in S for the ⊆ order. We use strategy λ R in the rest of the proof.
Item a). We first prove that R is strongly connected. By contradiction, assume it is not the case, i.e., that there exist s, s ∈ R such that there is no path in R from s to s . Then, let R be the set of states reachable with strategy λ R from a prefix ρ ending in s. By Lemma 15, we have that R ∈ S. But as there is no path from s to s in R, we have that s ∈ R and R R. This contradicts the minimality of R, hence we conclude that R is strongly connected. We now have to prove that R is a trap for P 2 . Clearly, for any state s ∈ R ∩ S 1 , we have Succ(s) ∩ R = ∅, as R is strongly connected. Hence, it remains to show that for all s ∈ R ∩ S 2 , we have Succ(s) ⊆ R. By contradiction, fix some s ∈ R ∩ S 2 and assume there exists s ∈ R such that (s, s ) ∈ E. As R belongs to S, recall that R = States(Out M s (λ)) for some strategy λ and state s . Since s ∈ R, there exists a prefix ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s (λ)) such that Last(ρ) = s. But then, prefix ρ = ρ · s also belongs to Pref(Out M s (λ)), and s ∈ R. Thus, we conclude that R is indeed a trap for P 2 .
Item b). Fix any s ∈ R and let us prove that s |= M R S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦R max even (p 1 )). As seen above, from the minimality of R and Lemma 15, we know that s, λ R |= M R S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). Now, again from the minimality of R in S, we know that in the subtree induced by Out M s (λ R ), any non-empty subset R ⊆ R is dense. That is, for every prefix ρ, the subtree defined by λ R from ρ reaches a state of R , and this holds in all subsequent subtrees. Using the reduction to a parity-Büchi game which underlies Theorem 4, we deduce from the density argument presented in Appendix A that we can build λ from λ R such that s, λ |= M R S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦R ). It remains to argue that R max even (p 1 ) is non-empty to prove this item. This is necessarily true, otherwise R max odd (p 1 ) would be non-empty and λ R would not ensure S(p 1 ) in R (as R max odd (p 1 ) would be a dense subset).
Item c). This is trivial as, for s ∈ R, λ R enforces s, λ R |= M R S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), a stronger property.
Reaching UGECs. Let us now collect in U min = ∪ R∈min ⊆ (S) R all states that belong to minimal sets R of S, and establish that U min can be reached almost-surely if it holds that s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). Lemma 17. The following holds: s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) =⇒ s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U min ).
Proof. Let λ be a witness for s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). By Lemma 16, we know that UGEC(M) is non-empty, and so is U min . Furthermore, we claim that U min is dense in the tree induced by Out M s0 (λ). Indeed, by Lemma 15, after any prefix ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s0 (λ)), the following property holds: Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) (hence U min is reached, repeating the previous arguments). Since this holds for all consistent prefixes, we have that U min is indeed dense in the tree of λ. Hence, again using the density argument presented in Appendix A, we can build λ from λ such that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U min ).
Algorithm
Lemma 14 and Lemma 17 prove the correctness of the reduction presented in Lemma 9. It is the cornerstone of our algorithm deciding whether the property s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) holds. . If the answer is Yes, then there exists an infinite-memory witness strategy, and infinite memory is in general necessary. This decision problem is at least as hard as solving parity games.
Proof. The algorithm can be sketched as follows:
1. Compute the set max ⊆ (SGEC(M)) of maximal super-good ECs, using [1] . Those are the maximal ECs satisfying condition (1 U ) in Definition 8. There are only polynomially many of them, and their computation is in NP ∩ coNP.
2.
For each of them, check if condition (2 U ) holds using Lemma 10. This can be done in polynomial time, and if a super-good EC does not satisfy (2 U ), then it is also the case of all its sub-ECs (as seen by the proof of Lemma 10). Hence, we have that
3.
Decide if s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U) using Theorem 4. This is in NP ∩ coNP. If it holds, then answer Yes, otherwise answer No.
The correctness of this algorithm was established in Lemma 9. It belongs to NP ∩ coNP, and it trivially generalizes classical parity games (e.g., by taking p 2 : s → 0 for all s ∈ S).
Finally, let us discuss strategies. A witness strategy λ plays as follows: (i) it plays as the finite-memory strategy witness for s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U) given by Theorem 4 until a UGEC C is reached, (ii) then it switches to the infinite-memory strategy λ C described in Definition 11. It is clear that such a strategy is a witness for s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), as expected.
Infinite memory is required in general, as shown in the UGEC C depicted in Figure 2 : there exists no finite-memory witness strategy in C. Indeed, assume P 1 is restricted to a finite-memory strategy λ. To be able to ensure p 1 on the play in which P 2 always goes to c from b, P 1 must visit d infinitely often, and because of the finite memory of λ, he must do it after a bounded number of steps along which a is not visited: say n steps. Hence, the probability to do it will be bounded from below by a strictly positive constant, here 2 − n 2 (the probability that P 2 chooses c for n 2 times in a row), all along a consistent play. Therefore, P 1 will almost-surely visit d infinitely often, and p 2 will actually be satisfied with probability zero.
Parity with threshold probability under parity constraint
We now turn to the problem s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ∼c (p 2 ) for ∼ ∈ {>, ≥} and c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1).
Very-good end-components.
In addition to UGECs, we need the new notion of very-good end-component.
Definition 19.
An end-component C of M is very-good (VGEC) if the following two properties hold:
We introduce the following notations: VGEC(M) is the set of all VGECs of M, V = ∪ V ∈VGEC(M) V is the set of states that belong to a VGEC in M.
Note that in condition (1 V ), P 1 is allowed to leave C to ensure S(p 1 ): this is in contrast to condition (1 U ) for UGECs, in Definition 8. On the contrary, condition (2 V ) is exactly the same as (2 U ).
From these definitions, it is trivial to see that any UGEC is also a VGEC, but the converse is false. Consider Figure 3 (δ is the uniform distribution): {a, b, c} is a VGEC. The strategy ensuring (2 V ) from a is to go to b, and the strategy ensuring (1 V ) from a is to go to d. As we will prove in Lemma 21 and as in all VGECs, P 1 can ensure a |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ) for any ε > 0. Still, {a, b, c} is not a UGEC: no strategy ensures S(p 1 ) on M {a,b,c} , as P 2 can enforce the play (ab) ω that has odd maximal priority. This illustrates why the notion of UGEC is too strong when reasoning about threshold probability instead of almost-sure satisfaction, hence why we need to introduce VGECs. Figure 3 The EC {a, b, c} is very-good but not ultra-good, as P1 has to leave it to ensure S(p1).
Available strategies in VGECs. As for UGECs, we will use witness strategies for conditions (1 V ) and (2 V ). Deciding if condition (1 V ) holds is solving a classical parity game, which lies in NP ∩ coNP [16] . Uniform pure memoryless witness strategies exist. We denote by λ 1 such a witness. For simplicity of presentation, we assume in the following that all states of M satisfy (1 V ), as otherwise they will trivially not satisfy the properties we consider (as S(p 1 ) will not be ensured). For condition (2 V ), we established in Lemma 10 that deciding if it holds can be done in polynomial time and that uniform randomized memoryless witness strategies exist. We denote by λ 2,C such a witness.
Reaching VGECs. We prove a strong relationship between the measure of paths that satisfy the two parity objectives p 1 and p 2 , and the measure of paths that reach VGECs, under any strategy.
Lemma 20. For all s ∈ S, all c ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, ∼ ∈ {>, ≥}, and all λ ∈ Λ, the following implication holds:
Proof. Let Π = {π ∈ Out M s (λ) | max s∈inf(π) p 1 (s) and max s∈inf(π) p 2 (s) are even} be the set of consistent plays from s that are winning for both p 1 and p 2 . The measure of Π under λ is ∼ c by hypothesis. Now, let us define the set Π as Π from which we remove the plays π such that inf(π) is not an EC. By Lemma 3, the measure of Π \ Π is equal to zero, and so the measure of Π is ∼ c. Now, let us note that any remaining play π in Π visits (even infinitely many times) the EC inf(π), and by definition of Π, there exists a witness for (2 V ): it suffices to play uniformly at random in inf(π). Since (1 V ) is satisfied everywhere, we have that inf(π) is a VGEC. All the states of such VGECs belong to V by definition, and so we are done.
Limit-sure satisfaction in VGECs. For each state in a VGEC, we claim that the parity objective p 2 can be satisfied with probability arbitrarily close to one, while ensuring p 1 surely.
. For all s ∈ C and ε ∈ (0, 1], the following property holds: s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ).
Proof. Our goal is to define a witness strategy λ ε . First, for ε ∈ (0, 1], we fix an infinite sequence of strictly positive rational probabilities f : N → Q ∩ (0, 1] such that the product of all those probabilities is larger than 1 − ε, i.e., i∈N f (i) > 1 − ε. Such a sequence always exists. In turn, we use Lemma 10 to associate to f a sequence of natural numbers g : N → N such that if λ 2,C (the witness strategy for (2 V )) is played for g(i) steps from any s ∈ C, then the set D max even (p 1 ) associated to λ 2,C is visited during those g(i) steps with probability larger than f (i). Now, we are in position to define for all ε ∈ (0, 1], a strategy λ ε,C that enforces, from s ∈ C, the property S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ). The strategy λ ε,C uses a counter i whose value is initially equal to 0. At round i, the strategy plays as λ 2,C for g(i) steps. During those last g(i) steps, if the set D max even (p 1 ) is visited, then the counter i is incremented and the next round is executed. Otherwise, the strategy switches to λ 1 forever.
It is easy to see that, because of the definition that we have used for the sequence g, the probability that we ever switch to the strategy λ 1 is less than ε. So with probability larger than 1 − ε, we always play λ 2,C , which implies that λ ε,C ensures P >1−ε (p 2 ). Also, on all consistent plays in which strategy λ 2,C is played forever, we know that the maximal priority seen infinitely often for p 1 is even (by definition of D max even (p 1 )). On the other plays, as we play λ 1 , we also have that the maximal priority seen infinitely often for p 1 is even. So, we can also conclude that λ ε,C ensures S(p 1 ), which concludes our proof.
The strict threshold case
We first solve the strict threshold case with an approach that relies on VGECs. Similarly to what we did in Section 4, we will establish a reduction of the decision problem for s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ) to a reachability problem toward the set V, i.e., the union of VGECs. The actual algorithm will be detailed in Section 5.3.
The first lemma allows us to detect positive instances of the problem by giving a sufficient condition under which the property is satisfied. Note that its proof is constructive and tells us how to construct witness strategies.
Lemma 22. The following holds:
Proof. Let λ ♦V be a uniform pure memoryless strategy that ensures to reach V with probability q > c from s 0 (it exists by Lemma 2) . Recall that λ 1 is a uniform pure memoryless strategy that enforces S(p 1 ) from any state in M. Let ε be such that q > c 1−ε , and for all C ∈ VGEC(M), let λ ε,C be a strategy that ensures S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ) when played from any state in C, as defined in the proof of Lemma 21.
We construct the strategy λ that witnesses the desired property starting from the elements defined above. Let r be a number of steps sufficient to ensure that V is reached with a probability larger than c 1−ε when playing λ ♦V from s 0 : it exists by Lemma 2. Strategy λ plays as λ ♦V for r steps. If a VGEC C of M is reached during those r steps, λ immediately switches to λ ε,C . Otherwise, after the r steps, λ switches to λ 1 forever. It is easy to verify that, when λ is played, the probability that p 2 holds is larger than c 1−ε · (1 − ε), and so it is larger than c. Furthermore, p 1 holds on all consistent plays, which proves that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ) holds.
This second lemma allows us to detect negative instances of the problem by giving a necessary condition for the property to hold.
Lemma 23. The following holds: s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ) =⇒ s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (♦V).
Proof. First, recall that λ 1 is a uniform pure memoryless strategy that enforces S(p 1 ) from any state in M. Second, as s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ), by Lemma 20 and Lemma 2, there exists a uniform pure memoryless strategy λ ♦V that reaches V with probability q > c from s 0 .
We construct a strategy λ that witnesses s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (♦V) starting from λ 1 and λ ♦V above. Let r be a number of steps such that, if λ ♦V is played for r steps, then the probability to reach V from s 0 is larger than c: it exists by Lemma 2. Strategy λ starts from s 0 by playing as λ ♦V . It stops as soon as V is reached or if r steps have been played and V has not been reached: in both cases, it switches to λ 1 forever. It is easy to check that λ reaches V with probability larger than c and it enforces S(p 1 ) by definition of λ 1 and prefix-independence of the parity objective. Hence, it holds that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (♦V).
The non-strict threshold case
First, we note that, as we have solved the strict case above, the only interesting remaining case is when P 1 , while surely forcing p 1 , can force p 2 with probability c, but no more. The following two lemmas present a solution to this case. The main conceptual tool here is UGECs. As for the strict case, the corresponding algorithm will be detailed in Section 5.3.
The first lemma gives a sufficient condition that permits to detect positive instances of the problem. Its proof is constructive: it explains how to build witness strategies. Recall that U = ∪ U ∈UGEC(M) U is the set of states that belong to a UGEC in M.
Lemma 24. The following holds: s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (♦U) =⇒ s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (p 2 ).
Proof. Let λ ♦U be a finite-memory strategy that witnesses property s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (♦U). It exists by Theorem 6. For all C ∈ UGEC(M), let λ C be an infinite-memory witness for s |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ), for all s ∈ C: it exists by Lemma 12. From those strategies, we define the strategy λ as follows. From s 0 , λ plays as λ ♦U up to reaching a UGEC C of M, or forever if U is never reached. If some UGEC C is reached, then it switches to λ C forever.
We claim that λ is a witness for s 0 |= S(p 1 )∧P ≥c (p 2 ). First, S(p 1 ) clearly holds as strategy λ ♦U and all strategies λ C ensure it. Second, λ ♦U ensures to reach U with probability at least c, and when some UGEC C ⊆ U is reached, the strategy λ C ensures p 2 with probability one. Thus, λ ensures p 2 with probability at least c from s 0 , and we are done.
We now turn to a lemma that allows us to detect negative instances of the problem, keeping in mind that we are interested in the case where P 1 cannot ensure probability strictly larger than c.
Lemma 25. The following holds:
(s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (p 2 )) ∧ (s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 )) =⇒ s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (♦U).
Proof. Let λ be a strategy that witnesses s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (p 2 ). As s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ), the measure of Π = {π ∈ Out M s0 (λ) | max s∈inf(π) p 1 (s) and max s∈inf(π) p 2 (s) are even} is exactly equal to c. We define Π as Π from which we remove all play π such that inf(π) is not an EC. By Lemma 3, the measure of Π is equal to the one of Π. As all plays in Π satisfy both p 1 and p 2 and are such that inf(π) is an EC, we conclude that they all reach a VGEC (as conditions (1 V ) and (2 V ) are satisfied in inf(π)).
Let π ∈ Π and let ρ be a prefix of π such that Last(ρ) ∈ C for some C ∈ VGEC(M). We claim that Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ). We prove it by contradiction. Assume that λ[ρ] only enforces p 2 with probability 1 − ε for some ε > 0. As Last(ρ) belongs to the VGEC C, we invoke Lemma 21 to build a strategy λ ρ such that Last(ρ), λ ρ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ) for ε < ε. Now, to obtain the contradiction, we construct a new strategy λ from s 0 that plays as λ but switches to λ ρ after prefix ρ. We have that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >c (p 2 ), which contradicts our hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that Last(ρ), λ[ρ] |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(p 2 ) holds.
Finally, applying Lemma 17 to Last(ρ), we know that Last(ρ) |= S(p 1 ) ∧ AS(♦U). As the measure of Π is equal to c and this reasoning holds for any π ∈ Π , we conclude that s 0 , λ |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (♦U) and we are done.
Algorithm
Based on the reductions shown above, we can now establish an algorithm and complexity results for the threshold problem.
Theorem 26. Given an MDP M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ), a state s 0 ∈ S, and two priority functions 1) . If the answer is Yes, then there exists an infinite-memory witness strategy, and infinite memory is in general necessary. This decision problem is at least as hard as solving parity games.
Proof. The algorithm can be sketched as follows: 
4.
Use the sub-algorithm described in Theorem 18 to compute the set U representing the union of UGECs in M . This is in NP ∩ coNP. 5. Decide if s 0 |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P ≥c (♦U) using Theorem 6. This is in NP ∩ coNP. If it holds, answer Yes, otherwise answer No.
The correctness of this algorithm follows from Lemma 22, Lemma 23, Lemma 24, and Lemma 25. It belongs to NP ∩ coNP, and it trivially generalizes classical parity games (e.g., by taking p 2 : s → 0 for all s ∈ S).
Finally, let us discuss strategies. Witness strategies for the case > (resp. ≥) were described in Lemma 22 (resp. Lemma 24). In both cases, infinite memory is in general required, because it is in general necessary to play optimally in both VGECs and UGECs. For UGECs, see Theorem 18 for an example. For VGECs, consider the VGEC {a, b, c} in the MDP of Figure 3 .
We claim that for every finite-memory strategy λ ensuring S(p 1 ), the probability to ensure p 2 is zero, hence there is no finite-memory witness for a |= S(p 1 ) ∧ P >1−ε (p 2 ). As argued for the UGEC case, in order to ensure p 1 on the play in which P 2 always goes to a from b, P 1 must go to d at some point, and because of the finite memory of λ, he must do it after a bounded number of steps along which c is not visited: say n steps. Again, the probability to do it will be bounded from below by a strictly positive constant, here 2 − n 2 (the probability that P 2 chooses a for n 2 times in a row), all along a consistent play. Therefore, P 1 will almost-surely go to d, and p 2 will actually be satisfied with probability zero.
Conclusion
In this paper, we further extended the beyond worst-case synthesis framework by providing tools to reason about ω-regular conditions, representing functional requirements of systems. We studied the case of two parity objectives and proved NP ∩ coNP membership for all considered variants. It is interesting to note that our algorithms can easily be generalized to more than two parity objectives as long as we consider only the S and AS operators. Indeed, we have that for any MDP M, any state s in M, and any number of priority functions p 1 , . . . p n , it holds that s |= i S(p i ) j AS(p j ) ⇐⇒ s |= S i p i ∧ AS j p j , and it is easy to reduce the latter problem to s |= S(p ) ∧ AS(p ) on a (larger) MDP M , using classical techniques. Extending this generalization to the operator P ∼c is more challenging and would require to mix our techniques to methods for percentile queries [19] : an interesting direction for future work.
Another worthwhile question to address is the limits of finite-memory strategies. We saw that in general, infinite memory is needed to satisfy problems involving two parity objectives. We would like to investigate under which additional conditions finite-memory strategies suffice, and to develop corresponding algorithms, as finite-memory strategies are of utmost practical interest.
A Additional tools related to density
In this section, we develop a density argument that is needed to prove the right-to-left implications of Lemma 7, and Lemma 9 in Section 4.2. We place this argument in appendix, as it essentially gives an explicit presentation of results that implicitly follow from [1] : hence it is not a new contribution.
Density. Let M = (G = (S, E), S 1 , S 2 , δ) be an MDP, s ∈ S an initial state, λ a strategy, and R ⊆ S. We say that R is dense in λ from s if and only if for all ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s (λ)), there exists ρ such that ρ · ρ ∈ Pref(Out M s (λ)) and Last(ρ ) ∈ R. That is, after all prefixes in the tree Out M s (λ), there is a continuation that visits R. Büchi objective. The Büchi objective is a parity objective with priorities in {1, 2}, where states with priority 2 are called Büchi accepting states, defining a set B: Büchi(B) = {π ∈ Plays(G) | inf(π) ∩ B = ∅}.
Almost-sure reachability under parity constraint. We first give explicitly the construction of [2, Lemma 3] (extended version of [1] ), that we used implicitly in Theorem 4. . If the answer is Yes, then there exists a finite-memory witness strategy. This decision problem is at least as hard as parity games.
To solve the decision problem of Theorem 27, Almagor et al. construct a two-player zerosum game with a conjunction of a Büchi and a parity objectives. We recall the construction here. To simplify the formal definition and w.l.o.g., we make the hypothesis that in M, E ⊆ S 1 × S 2 ∪ S 2 × S 1 , i.e., states of P 1 and P 2 alternate. Then the game G M R,p is defined as follows.
The state space of G M R,p is a copy of the state space of M where the states in S 2 \ R have been duplicated in three copies as shown in Figure 4 . Then S is defined as S = S 1 ∪S 2 ∪(S 2 \R)×{square, circle}: P 1 owns the states in S 1 and (S 2 \R)×{circle}, and P 2 owns the states in S 2 and (S 2 \ R) × {square}. The set of edges are defined according to Figure 4 with the additional property that states in R are made absorbing. That is, E is the union of the following sets: 
